All of the articles below are penultimate(ish) drafts, made available out of professional courtesy. Please cite the published versions, not these. (And here's a short and intermittently up-to-date CV)
"Against Dispositionalism: Belief in Cognitive Science", (with Jake Quilty-Dunn) Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming)
"Inferential Transitions", (with Jake Quilty-Dunn) Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming).
"Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents Of Perception," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2017) 94:3
“Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias”, Nous 50:3 (2016) 629–658
"Believing without Reason: Or Why Liberals Shouldn't Watch Fox News", (with Jake Quilty-Dunn) Harvard Review of Philosophy 22 (2015):42-52
“The Automatic and the Ballistic: Modularity Beyond Perceptual Processes”, Philosophical Psychology 28:8 (2014):1147-1156
“Thinking is Believing”, Inquiry 57, no. 1 (2014): 55-96.
“Against Alief”, Philosophical Studies 165, no. 1 (2013): 197-211.
“Numerical Architecture”, Topics in Cognitive Science 5, no. 2 (2013): 367-86.
“Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: NBAR Theory” (with David Ripley), Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 no. 3 (2012): 351-68.
“Locke’s Answer to Molyneux’s Thought Experiment” (with Mike Bruno). History of Philosophy Quarterly 27, no.2 (2010): 165–80.
“Responsibility and the Brain Sciences”, (with Felipe De Brigard and David Ripley). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12, no. 5 (2009): 511–24.
“What is the Narrow Content of FENCE (and Other Definitionally and Interpretationally Primitive Concepts)?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 no. 3 (2011): 138.
“Expectations and Morality: A Dilemma” (with David Ripley). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, no. 4 (2010): 346.
Book Chapters, Reviews, and Encyclopedia Articles
“Associationism”, Stanford Encyclopedia Entry, (2015).
“Poetic Opacity: How to Paint Things with Words” in The Philosophy of Poetry, ed. John Gibson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2015).
“The Powers That Bind: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation” (with Neil Levy) in The Ethics of Belief, ed. Jon Matheson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2014): 12-33.
Review of The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science, K. Frankish and W. Ramsey (eds.) (with Bryce Huebner). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, (2013):
“A Potted History of Mental States” (with Mark Phelan), in Philosophy: Traditional and Experimental Readings, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Ron Mallon, and Shaun Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press, (2012): 193-202.
“Brain Damage and Dualism” (with Shaun Nichols and Mark Phelan), in Philosophy: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Ron Mallon, and Shaun Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press, (2012) 212-6.
The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing
Dissertations are funny things. I wouldn't suggest reading them for a good time. That said, a few times a year I'll be asked to send someone a copy. In case you're one of these odd folks who want to read a dissertation, a version of mine is linked above. I highly recommend reading something more fun (I was compelled to excise the jokes, so it is brutally unfunny. Belated apologies to Jesse Prinz, Josh Knobe, Susanna Siegel, Bill Lycan, and especially Fred Dretske. He appreciated the jokes in an earlier version and would be horrified at the thought of posting this without humor. He really was the best. May he rest in peace).