All of the articles below are penultimate(ish) drafts, made available out of professional courtesy. Please cite the published versions, not these. (And here's a short and intermittently up-to-date CV).
"Troubles with Bayesianism: An Introduction to the Psychological Immune System" Mind & Language (Forthcoming)
"Against Dispositionalism: Belief in Cognitive Science", (with Jake Quilty-Dunn) Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming)
"Inferential Transitions", (with Jake Quilty-Dunn) Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming).
“Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias”, Nous 50:3 (2016) 629–658
"Believing without Reason: Or Why Liberals Shouldn't Watch Fox News", (with Jake Quilty-Dunn) Harvard Review of Philosophy 22 (2015):42-52
“The Automatic and the Ballistic: Modularity Beyond Perceptual Processes”, Philosophical Psychology 28:8 (2014):1147-1156
“Thinking is Believing”, Inquiry 57, no. 1 (2014): 55-96.
“Against Alief”, Philosophical Studies 165, no. 1 (2013): 197-211.
“Numerical Architecture”, Topics in Cognitive Science 5, no. 2 (2013): 367-86.
“Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: NBAR Theory” (with David Ripley), Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 no. 3 (2012): 351-68.
“Locke’s Answer to Molyneux’s Thought Experiment” (with Mike Bruno). History of Philosophy Quarterly 27, no.2 (2010): 165–80.
“Responsibility and the Brain Sciences”, (with Felipe De Brigard and David Ripley). Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12, no. 5 (2009): 511–24.
“What is the Narrow Content of FENCE (and Other Definitionally and Interpretationally Primitive Concepts)?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 no. 3 (2011): 138.
“Expectations and Morality: A Dilemma” (with David Ripley). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, no. 4 (2010): 346.
Book Chapters, Reviews, and Encyclopedia Articles
“Associationist Theories of Thought”, Stanford Encyclopedia Entry, (2015).
“Poetic Opacity: How to Paint Things with Words” in The Philosophy of Poetry, ed. John Gibson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2015).
“The Powers That Bind: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Obligation” (with Neil Levy) in The Ethics of Belief, ed. Jon Matheson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2014): 12-33.
“A Potted History of Mental States” (with Mark Phelan), in Philosophy: Traditional and Experimental Readings, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Ron Mallon, and Shaun Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press, (2012): 193-202.
“Brain Damage and Dualism” (with Shaun Nichols and Mark Phelan), in Philosophy: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Ron Mallon, and Shaun Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press, (2012) 212-6.
Dissertations are funny things. I wouldn't suggest reading them for a good time. That said, a few times a year I'll be asked to send someone a copy. In case you're one of these odd folks who want to read a dissertation, a version of mine is linked above. I highly recommend reading something more fun (I was compelled to excise the jokes, so it is brutally unfunny. Belated apologies to Jesse Prinz, Josh Knobe, Susanna Siegel, Bill Lycan, and especially Fred Dretske. He appreciated the jokes in an earlier version and would be horrified at the thought of posting this without humor. He really was the best. May he rest in peace).
Also, I've won some awards, which is nice. Here are a few of the most august of them (I list them knowing how distasteful this may be. Alas.) In late December 2017 I received an NEH Fellowship, which is generous and excellent of them. Earlier in 2017 I received the Baruch College Presidential Excellence in Scholarship Prize. Earlier than that I was lucky enough to be selected for other things, like the ACLS New Faculty Fellowship, the Cognitive Science Society's inaugural Glushko Dissertation Prize, the Roger Shepard Prize (for best dissertation in the cognitive sciences--yes it was that Roger Shepard, which is very cool), the Mellon/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellowship, the UNC Society of Fellows Fellowship.